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Institutional investors are now the predominant type of investor in global financial markets. 
Institutional investors now own more than 64% of the equity in the US stock markets (Federal 
Reserve Board 2011). In Australia, institutional investors own approximately 60% of the stock 
market. They are also responsible for the majority of the trades (96% of all trades) in US 
markets. Yet there still remain many unanswered questions about the impact of institutional 
investors. The most basic and obvious of these questions is whether institutional investors 
possess superior investments skills. Given that institutional investors controlled trillions of 
dollars of funds under delegated management, it seems in congruous that there is still no 
consensus in the literature about whether they possess superior investments skills. The 
increase in size has also given institutional investors significant influence. This prompts the 
question of how these large investors choose to utilise their influence. Whether institutional 
investors’ presence and activities improve the efficiency of the financial markets, and what 
role institutional investors play in important corporate decisions.  
Using a unique set of daily institutional ownership data, we present four empirical studies on 
the Australian stock market that aims to provide greater understanding of the impact of 
institutional ownership. Study 1 examines the question of whether institutional investors 
possess superior skills. The empirical findings suggest that institutional trading as measured by 
institutional ownership flows prove to be a good gauge of stock returns. The firms that 
experience the greatest inflow in institutional ownership exhibited superior performance 
throughout the 12-month period. Consistent with literature, we showed that institutional 
investors exhibited superior judgement in their trading in stocks of particular characteristics 
including small, large stocks, growth stocks and value stocks.  
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In the second study, we turn our attention to an evaluation of the impact of institutional 
investors in IPOs. In spite of the plethora of studies in the Initial public offerings (IPOs) 
literature, there have been few studies on the impact of institutional ownership in IPOs. Our 
results suggest that institutional ownership plays an important role in explaining the duo 
anomalies of IPO underpricing and the long-run underperformance of issuers. Consistent with 
previous studies, we found large underpricing which was greatest in those issuers with the 
highest initial institutional ownership levels. Yet these issuers experienced the worst long-run 
underperformance. The findings are consistent with overreactions driven by informational 
cascade in the IPO market. High level of initial institutional interests generates informational 
herding that drives these issuers’ prices beyond the fundamental. Over time, market 
correction leads to the long-run underperformance of issuers. The findings suggest that 
Institutional investors’ presence in IPO may lead to greater mispricing in process already beset 
with uncertainty.  
Study 3 of the thesis examine whether there is any evidence that institutional investors fulfil 
the very important role as monitors of corporate managers’ actions. Many have hoped that 
the large equity stakes that institutional investors owned in corporations will give them 
sufficient incentives to act as an important source of corporate governance (see Black 1992; 
Kahn & Minton 1998). In so doing, institutional investors can help to reduce the agency 
problem that arise as the result of the separation of ownership and management. We test 
whether institutional investors fulfil this key role as monitors in a sample of Australian mergers 
and acquisitions. We found limited support for institutional monitoring. While the market have 
more favourable reactions to the takeover announcements made by bidders with high levels of 
institutional ownership, these bidders did not exhibit superior stock market performance in 
the long-run. Rather than performing the very important role as monitor, our results suggest 
that institutional investors may have a preference for following the Wall Street Rule and vote 
xiv 
 
with their feet. Institutional trading (as measured by changes in institutional ownership) 
immediately prior to the takeover announcement provided a good indication of the long term 
performance of the bidder.  
In the final study, we examined whether institutional investors’ activities contribute to the 
turn-of-the year effect in the Australia. We do so with the view that the results may be a 
reflection of the impact of institutional investors on market efficiency more generally. The 
Turn-of-the-year effect refers to the abnormally high returns for small stock in the month of 
January (and July for countries like Australia). The anomalous seasonality in returns is one of 
the most enduring anomalies in global financial markets. For both the December/January and 
the June/July period, we examine the institutional investors’ flows to determine whether there 
is a link with institutional investors’ action and the turn-of-the-year effects. Our results are 
consistent with institutional investors conducting window dressing trades in the 
December/January period. It is important to note that Australia’s financial year ends in June, 
so there are incentives for institutions to conduct both window dressing and tax-related selling 
in the June/July period. We found strong evidence that institutional investors conduct tax-
related transactions and that these trades significantly impact on the stock returns in the 
June–July period. We come to the conclusion that institutional investors put greater 
importance on tax related selling than window-dressing in the June July period.  
These four empirical studies have served to enhance our understanding of the impact of 
Institutional Investors who are an ever-growing influence on global financial markets.  
 
  
